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Abstract—Albeit people worldwide cry out for the protection
of their privacy, they often fail to successfully protect their
private data. Possible reasons for this failure that have been
identified in previous research include a lack of knowledge about
possible privacy consequences, the negative outcome of a rational
cost-benefit analysis, and insufficient ability for protection on
the users’ side. However, these findings mainly base on theo-
retical considerations or results from quantitative studies, and
no comprehensive explanation for users’ privacy behavior has
been found so far. We thus conducted an interview study with
24 participants to qualitatively investigate what are (1) users’
mental models of privacy consequences, (2) obstacles for privacy
protection, and (3) strategies for privacy protection. Our results
provide evidence for all possible explanations: We find that most
of our participants are indeed unaware of most consequences
that could result from not protecting their privacy besides
personalized advertisement and financial loss. We also identify
several obstacles for privacy protection, such as protection being
too much effort, too complicated, users lacking knowledge, or
social aspects. Protection strategies mostly base on reducing the
amount of data disclosed and most users refrain from using
advanced PETs. We further identified additional factors which
influence whether people adopt measures to protect their privacy
and propose a model which subsumes all factors that are relevant
for people’s decision to apply protection measures.
Index Terms—Privacy protection, Interviews, Privacy paradox,
Privacy consequences, Protection obstacles
I. INTRODUCTION
Albeit the ever evolving opportunities of smart technical
devices offer many benefits in terms of convenience nowadays,
they also come along with an overwhelming omnipresence
of data capturing. It is therefore not surprising the majority
of US-American adults (91%) think that consumers have
lost control over how personal information is collected and
used by companies [1] and half of the US-American Internet
users worry about the amount of information available about
them online [2]. Similar numbers apply for European, Asian,
African and South American users [3]–[5]. It could therefore
be concluded that privacy is a major issue for users worldwide
and a considerable amount of users should make certain efforts
to protect their private data.
However, if we take a closer look at most people’s daily
handling of their private data, we often find that this is not
the case [3], [6]. Indeed, in many cases do people not only
voluntarily give away these personal data by posting details of
their private life in social networks or using fitness trackers and
online shopping websites which include profiling functions,
but also rarely make an effort to protect their data actively,
for example through the deletion of cookies on a regular basis
or the encryption of their email communication. But why is it
that they fail to successfully protect their data?
This phenomenon is well known among privacy researchers
and often referred to as “privacy paradox” [7]–[9]. It has
been argued that people simply lack awareness of privacy
threats which leads to their unconcerned handling of private
data [10]. This is in line with threat avoidance theory, which
states that in order to be motivated to avoid a threat in the IT
context, people have to perceive this threat as malicious, i.e.,
that they are susceptible to this threat and that the negative
consequences will be severe [11]. Our first research question
thus is: What are people’s mental models of possible
consequences arising from not protecting their privacy?
Several other explanations for the privacy paradox have
been proposed so far, one of the most popular being the
weighting up of costs and benefits (“privacy calculus”) [12],
including social pressure [13]. We therefore aim to gain an
understanding of what users consider to be the costs of privacy
protection and benefits of using privacy-threatening devices
and services by answering the following research question:
What are obstacles for privacy protection and for what
reasons do people still use privacy-threatening devices and
services?
Other explanations suggest that people are aware of privacy
problems and motivated to encounter them, but fail to do so
because they lack knowledge about protection mechanisms
(e.g., the Tor software or encryption tools) [14] or they suffer
from an “illusion of control” when dealing with the privacy
of their data [15]. In line with that, prior studies showed that
people indeed seem to confuse the control over the publication
of information with the control over the assessment of that
information by third parties. According to this hypothesis, the
paradoxical behavior is caused by the false feeling of control
over the further usage of personal data, which occurs if users
can initially decide over the publication of it (e.g., by posting
in online social networks (OSN) and managing the privacy
settings for the post). Hence, to investigate whether users
simply lack knowledge about possible protection solutions
or whether they apply strategies which are not effective but
mainly make them feel like they have control over their data,
we propose the third research question as follows: What
strategies do people apply to protect their data?
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The explanations proposed so far by other researchers either
base on theoretical considerations or on empirical results
from - often quantitative - studies, examining one or several
aspects of people’s privacy attitude and behavior. Despite
the significant number of studies conducted in this filed, no
comprehensive explanation has been found so far and user
privacy remains a rather complex phenomenon that cannot
be entirely explained yet [16]. The present study therefore
aims to shed light on users’ privacy beliefs and behavior by
investigating how they protect their privacy, what are obstacles
for privacy protection or reasons for still using privacy threat-
ening services and devices, and what are their mental models
of possible consequences arising from not protecting their
privacy. To this end, we conducted semi-structured interviews
with 24 participants.
We find that our participants are indeed unaware of most
consequences that could result from data sharing and collec-
tion. Whereas nearly all mention personalized advertisement
as a possible consequence, only half of our participants refer
to the possibility of financial loss. Although other conse-
quences are mentioned (e.g., spam mails, criminal and political
prosecution, propaganda, safety threats, identity theft, or less
favorable insurance tariffs), only very few participants were
able to provide more than two or three consequences. We
can therefore conclude that most people seem to be unaware
of the rich set of possible consequences of data sharing
and collection. Our participants mentioned several protection
obstacles, such as protection being too much effort or too com-
plicated, lacking knowledge about protection measures, social
aspects, and ethical considerations. The most common reasons
provided for still using privacy threatening services were social
pressure and the desire to stay or keep others up to date.
Other reasons include convenience and the wish to express and
spread one’s opinion. However, several participants reported to
deploy certain protection strategies nonetheless, with most of
them relating to the reduction of data disclosed, either by not
using a particular service, not sharing certain types of data or
limiting the amount of recipients.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work relates to people’s mental models of privacy con-
sequences, obstacles for privacy protection, including reasons
for continuing to use privacy-threatening devices and services,
and strategies people apply to protect their privacy.
A. Mental models of privacy consequences
There are many surveys assessing how people perceive
different privacy risks, however, most of them present a set
of risks and ask participants to rate their degree of concerns
on a scale [17]–[20]. This approach is not sufficient to measure
whether people are actually aware of these privacy risks
without prompting them. Among the few who deployed a
different approach are Harbach, Fahl and Smith [21], who
asked German students and members of Amazon Mechanical
Turk to name IT security and privacy risks and consequences
in a survey. They found that participants usually overestimated
the amount of risks they were aware of. This is in line
with other studies, e.g., interviews conducted by Wash [22],
which indicate that people are often not aware of threats
and hence underestimate dangers. The consequence most
frequently provided by both groups of participants in Harbach
et al.’s study was financial loss, whereas the most salient risks
were malware, hackers and the theft of account credentials.
The most comprehensive approach to accessing people’s
awareness of privacy consequences was conducted by Kar-
watzki et al. [23], who ran a total of 22 focus groups in
which they asked their participants directly to name all privacy
consequences they are aware of. The authors derive seven
categories of privacy consequences based on the responses:
physical, social, resource-related, psychological, prosecution-
related, career-related, and freedom-related consequences. Al-
beit providing valuable insights on people’s awareness of
privacy consequences, Karwatzki et al. do not report the fre-
quency of consequences mentioned in the different categories.
Moreover, their participants mostly referred to consequences
that could arise from using OSN. It is thus questionable which
of their findings are application-specific and which generalize
to other online services and technologies.
Other examples of assessing people’s awareness of privacy
risks are interviews conducted by Friedman et al. [24], who
found that people were concerned about risks to their infor-
mation and especially their privacy, but did not further specify
these privacy risks, a survey on security and privacy risks of
eHealth wearables [25], interviews combined with a field study
concerning the risks of WiFi use [26], a comprehensive study
on user regrets regarding Facebook posts [27], a survey assess-
ing perceived risks of using mobile devices to conduct online
transactions [28], and surveys and interviews concerning risks
of cloud storage [29]. Shirazi and Volkamer [30] conducted
interviews with 20 people on identification and tracking on the
web, and found that their participants most often mentioned
personalized advertising as a possible consequence, which
some of them even considered to be beneficial. Melicher et
al. [31] found that participants in their interview study were
less comfortable with hidden outcomes of online tracking
(e.g., price discrimination) than with more overt consequences
(e.g., targeted advertisement). Although investigating specific
privacy risks, Melicher et al. focused on online tracking and
thus considered mainly risks specific to this application.
B. Obstacles for privacy protection
A few qualitative studies have been conducted on what
obstacles users face when aiming to protect their privacy
in several contexts. Shirazi and Volkamer [30], for example,
conducted interviews with 20 people, most of them lay users,
to investigate why most people do not use tools to protect
themselves against identification and tracking on the web.
They identified seven different explanations: (1) people mainly
worry about privacy issues other than identification and track-
ing, (2) people are not aware of the assessment of meta-data,
(3) people are not aware of the possibility to use meta-data
for identification and tracking, (4) people are not concerned
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because of several misconceptions such as being not aware of
consequences or the feeling that they have nothing to hide,
(5) people are not aware of protection tools, (6) people are
not able to use protection tools properly, (7) people become
side-tracked. Renaud, Volkamer and Renkema-Padmos [32]
combined semi-structured interviews, a survey, and a literature
review to identify obstacles to the adoption of end-to-end
(E2E) encrypted email. Their final list of seven explanations
includes lack of awareness, concern, and knowledge about
how to protect oneself, as well as misconceptions of how to
protect oneself, no perceived need to act, inability to use E2E
encryption and becoming side-tracked. In a more recent study,
Abu-Salma et al. [33] interviewed sixty users of different
communication tools to identify factors that influence the
adoption of secure messaging tools. Like Renaud et al. [32],
they found that usability is not the major obstacle for the
adoption of secure communication tools. In the messaging
context, other factors like fragmented user bases, along with
interoperability of the different messaging services are signif-
icant adoption obstacles. Participants also reported not to use
a communication tool if they evaluate its message and voice
call functionality to be of low quality.
C. Strategies for protecting one’s privacy
Several studies have been conducted on how people protect
their privacy by deploying a set of strategies. Most of these
studies focus on a particular context, e.g., managing photos
which are shared with other people [34], managing privacy in
OSN in general [35], [36] or with respect to others revealing
information about oneself [37], or when using WiFi [26].
Other studies describe strategies people deploy to address
specific problems, e.g., identity theft [38], or online harassment
[39]. Further, there are also studies dealing with a specific
protection strategy, like webcam covering [40], or lying for
privacy reasons [41].
A few studies focus on the general deployment of privacy
protection strategies. Oomen and Leenes [17] differ between
three sets of privacy protection strategies: (1) behavioral,
such as providing incorrect information, using anonymous
email addresses or pseudonyms, (2) employment of security
measures and use of PETs, such as spam filters, firewalls,
and anti spyware, and (3) use of more advanced PETs, such
as encryption tools, anonymous remailers, trust certificates,
and cookie crunchers. In a survey with Dutch students, they
found that about half of their participants employed behavioral
protection strategies, whereas the majority (between 74 and
89%) took standard security measures and used PETs, and
about a third used some of the more advanced protection
strategies, with trust certificates being the most (31%) and
anonymisers (3%) the least frequently used.
In a lab study with corresponding interviews, Coles-Kemp
and Kani-Zabihi [42] found that in an online registration
task, when participants where not comfortable providing their
information, most of them chose to give false information,
discontinue with the registration or continue the registration
and provide accurate information, but reduce their engagement
with the service. In their interview study, Abu-Salma et al.
[33] also asked their participants about strategies they applied
if they wanted to protect their communication data. The most
common strategy was to deliver sensitive information in per-
son, or using video-chat and voice-mails if a personal meeting
was not possible. Other practices include sending information
by post, using a foreign language for voice messages, and
cutting a message into several chunks which were then send
via different communication channels. Some participants also
reported to use a “code” to exchange sensitive information
with others, regardless of the communication channel used.
A number of studies have dealt with the deployment of dif-
ferent privacy protection strategies by Facebook users. Young
and Quan-Haase [43] found that university students mainly
adopted privacy protection strategies that restricted access to
their personal data for different members of the Facebook
community, rather than strategies that would allow them to
control data access for third parties. Furthermore, they showed
that university students do not use fictitious information as
protection strategy, since this would lead to confusion among
friends and peers. Another study by Staddon, Acquisti and
LeFevre [44] showed that users who value privacy features
most generally show more privacy actions such as not pro-
viding certain information, limiting post visibility or deleting
posts. Concerning cultural differences, the results of Peters,
Winschiers-Theophilus and Mennecke [45] indicate that US
users would rather remove friends from their contact list than
change their privacy settings to restrict the visibility of their
data, whereas Namibian users refuse from the deletion of
friends due to the concern of being rude. When it comes
to teenagers, Feng and Xie [46] found that older teenagers
tend to implement more privacy protection strategies (e.g.,
deleting someone from their friends list, deleting older posts),
whereas Litt [47] showed that younger adults are more likely
to show a wider use of technological privacy tools than older
adults, maybe due to greater knowledge of and skills in using
these technologies. Using interviews, user diaries and surveys,
Wang et al. [27] identified three different sets of protection
strategies, namely proactive (e.g., rejecting friend requests,
managing privacy settings), in-situ (e.g., self-censoring), and
reactive (e.g., deleting content, untagging photos), with the last
being the most frequently used strategy in their study.
III. METHODOLOGY
We conducted an exploratory study consisting of semi-
structured interviews with 24 participants and subsequent
qualitative analysis to evaluate their mental models of privacy
consequences, obstacles for privacy protection, and protection
strategies. The interviews were conducted in German, ques-
tions and quotations were translated for this paper.
A. Recruitment and Enrollment
We aimed for a heterogeneous sample, i.e., interviewing
people with different professional and sociodemographical
backgrounds, experiences, and expertise regarding online pri-
vacy. Therefore, we asked our student research assistants to
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invite friends and family members of whom they thought
would be interested in participating in our study. These
were then contacted to make an appointment without telling
them about the research topic. Instead, they were told the
interviews would focus on their “use of digital applications”.
Additionally, we send a corresponding invitation email via the
mailing list used to advertise studies among our university’s
undergraduate psychology students. We proceeded to recruit
new participants until data saturation was reached, i.e., there
came no new themes up during the interviews. Undergraduate
students received course credits for participating, however,
non-student participants did not receive any compensation but
participated voluntarily. We conducted several pilot interviews
to check the soundness of the questions and structure of the
interview guidelines. Based on the feedback of the participants
and our own impression during these pilot interviews, we
improved the interview guidelines iteratively.
B. Study design
The interview guidelines can be accessed at https://secuso.
aifb.kit.edu/english/889.php. The interviews took between 27
and 91 minutes, with an average of 48, and comprised the
following sections:
1) Welcome and general instructions: First, participants
were welcomed and informed about the study procedure and
purpose1. They were further informed about the study condi-
tions (see section III-D) and asked whether they consented to
the recording of their interview.
2) Use of digital communication channels: In the first part
of the interview, participants were asked to explain how they
used technology, i.e., hard- and software, to communicate with
other people. We did not ask actively about privacy, but if
participants mentioned privacy-related issues on their own, we
encouraged them to explain these in more detail.
3) Use of privacy-relevant applications and services:
Afterwards, we asked participants whether they used (and if
yes, which) OSN, messengers, navigation apps, shopping apps,
cloud services, online banking, electronic pay services, loyalty
programs, digital assistants, and game consoles. We further
asked whether they owned a smart TV and whether they had
already gotten the new version of the German ID card. Again,
we did not ask about privacy issues actively, but encouraged
participants to talk about their privacy beliefs if they had
mentioned them first. Where applicable, we asked participants
to justify their decisions not to use certain applications or
products.
4) Data privacy attitude and behavior: The final part
focused on participants’ privacy beliefs and behavior. We
asked them about their attitude towards data privacy, what
their social and professional environment thought about data
privacy, how they experienced the media coverage of this
topic and what they thought about personalized services like
Amazon’s product recommendations. They were asked to
1Note that in order not to bias participants towards privacy, we told them
the interview topic would be their use of digital applications instead of telling
them we were interested in their privacy beliefs and behavior.
explain which negative consequences could possibly arise from
data sharing and whether they had already experienced such
consequences in the past.
C. Participants
The interview group consisted of 24 participants (15 female,
9 male). Participants ranged between 17 and 53 years of
age (M=26.29, SD=6.90). Nineteen participants were students,
the other five participants’ professional backgrounds included
online journalist, event manager, office clerk, media manager,
and researcher. None of the participants had a professional
background in the computer sciences.
D. Ethical considerations
Ethical requirements for research involving human partic-
ipants are provided by an ethics commission at our univer-
sity. All relevant ethical requirements regarding research with
personal data were met. Participants were informed about
the procedure of the study, after which they could decide to
proceed or stop the interview. They were told that they could
stop the interview at any time without stating reasons and in
this case all data collected so far would be deleted. We further
assured them that the collected data would only be used for
research purposes, their identity would not be linked to their
responses, and their data would only be handled by members
of our research group and never passed on to third parties.
E. Evaluation methodology
We used open coding [48], [49] for the analysis to account
for the exploratory nature of our study. Thus, we were able
to only consider such themes and issues that were highly
relevant for our participants, which had not been possible by
using pre-defined codings. First, we reviewed the transcripts
and audio files to identify relevant themes and sub-categories
from the participants’ responses. Our final codebook included
four meta themes and 31 sub-categories. Based on these, two
authors independently coded all transcripts. Differences in the
coding were solved through discussion afterwards. We report
the number of participants who mentioned a theme or sub-
category in the following section. Where applicable, we add
(translated) quotes.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, the results of the data analysis are presented.
RQ1 is addressed in section IV-A, RQ2 in section IV-B, and
RQ3 in section IV-C. Section IV-D describes additional find-
ings about common privacy misconceptions. Where applicable,
we provide the corresponding number of participants who
made a statement and add the quotes from the participants
that we translated from German.
A. Mental model of privacy consequences
A few participants (7) thought even if they provided all
their data, nothing bad would happen at all: “Well, many
people are pretty skeptical and say they don’t want to be under
surveillance in any case [...] and make a huge scandal out of
it. I can’t really understand why...on the one hand I think I
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feel a bit...almost threatened, if some data of me is found, but
then I have...because at the moment I lack the idea of how
you could use this against me, that’s why.” (P9)
1) Personalized advertisement: Almost all participants (20)
mentioned that they would be shown or sent personalized
advertisement as a possible consequence of disclosing data.
Most participants did not like the idea of receiving person-
alized ads, but did not worry too much about it. A few
participants, however, reported to look favorable upon being
shown personalized ads: “And of course it’s in my interest
to get advertisement for products I’m potentially interested in
and not just for ladies’ underwear [...] I think it’s a good thing
it’s tailored to me, since I’m actually interested in the products
that I am shown.” (P19).
2) Financial loss: About half of the participants (12) talked
about financial loss as a consequence of disclosing data, partic-
ularly banking details. Whereas some participants were mainly
worried about passwords to their online banking accounts,
others were concerned about their IBANs as well because they
were not sure if it was possible to use this to debit money:
“I am always...I don’t know if that works, but if somebody
could debit a sum just having your IBAN, that would actually
be the fear. But I don’t know if that would really work.” (P7)
3) Job applications: A few participants (8) stated to be
worried about a potential future employer getting access to
their postings on social media and thus limiting their chances
of getting a job they had applied to: “[...] when you provide
your actual data and start posting things which are rather less
favorable in terms of employers being able to find you easily
and see what a person you are socially, if you are trustworthy
or not...and that could easily backfire.” (P4)
4) Safety threats: A few participants (7) were worried about
becoming victims of harassment or stalking due to disclosure
of their current location: “[...] that somebody shows up at your
home and bothers you” (P7)
5) Spam mails: A few participants (6) were worried about
receiving spam mails if their email address got disclosed.
6) Identity theft: A few participants (6) mentioned the
risk of identity theft, either as an abstract threat: “Maybe
somehow on the Internet, a doppelganger, e.g., that someone
collects every information about me and somehow creates a
new identity, which then is another me.” (P7) or with regard to
specific actions, like financial transactions, crime commitment
or social interaction: “[...] that criminals could possibly take
your identity to buy things or commit crimes and so on.” (P3)
7) Exposure: Few participants (6) thought data disclosure
could result in being exposed because they had done some-
thing they did not want their friends and family to know about:
“[...] because there could be data that I would be embarrassed
of if friends would find out about it. Because I suppose they
wouldn’t approve to certain behaviors or because I suppose
they would make fun about it, if they’d know it.” (P1)
8) Criminal prosecution: The few participants (5) who
talked about the possibility of being criminally prosecuted
mostly stated that only people committing crimes should be
worried about this: “If I’d be a criminal. Then there would be
information about me. Either where I am, what I buy, whom
I contact. That I don’t what to become public. But that does
not apply in my case. I don’t care who knows where I am at
what time, how much I bought.” (P2)
9) Political prosecution: Few participants (5) talked about
possible consequences that could result from governmental
surveillance. Those who did mostly stated to trust the current
German government, but were concerned about possible impli-
cations regarding future governments: “Many people say they
don’t give a damn whether someone eavesdrops on them, why
should someone care about their issues. But overall, I think
that’s not quite that simple. We currently live in a democracy,
the constitutional state works in that our personal rights are
protected rather well - so far. But that could change one day
and if the government can access all communication channels
then it could exploit this.” (P8)
10) Monopolization: A few participants (5) expressed con-
cerns about the monopoly of certain organizations through
control over a great amount of consumer data: “And I think we
are disclosing more and more about ourselves due to reasons
of security or convenience and hence, certain organizations are
getting more and more powerful, and those may dictate us a lot
of things in the future. [...] And organizations are not always
interested in the common welfare, but in their own profits and
if they have such a great power they could use this to restrict
our freedom one day.” (P3)
11) Data abuse: Few participants (4) were worried about
the unintended use of their data: “That happened to some
comedian, the AfD [german political party] canvassed with
his photo. That’s...that can be misused. [...] And suddenly you
appear as a dessous model in the US and have never heard
about that before.” (P11)
12) Burglary: Only very few participants (3) talked about
burglary as a potential risk of disclosing one’s location data.
Those who did, however, rated the risk as rather low.
13) Propaganda: Very few participants (2) reported to be
worried about their data being used to influence their opinion
in some way. Statements to this topic mainly referred to the
recent US election: “Um, recently in the US elections the
way the Republicans run their election campaign and there
was a media report about it. About an analytic software, how
you categorize certain groups of people. To break it down,
they knew which people they should address and what would
be reasonable, what groups of people should be addressed to
suceed with the election campaign.” (P8)
14) Less favorable insurance tariffs: Location and health
data were mentioned by very few participants (2) in association
with the risk to get a less favorable health insurance tariff: “Or,
if we’re getting on with these fitness and health trackers that
store various data, that, e.g., a health insurance company could
say ’Well, we saw via your app or fitness tracker that you don’t
work out very much. No wonder you’re sick now, that’s your
own fault. We’re not paying you anything.”’ (P3)
15) Not being granted a credit: Only one participant men-
tioned the possibility of being refused a credit: “Well then, it
could be possible that not just the employer uses the data, but
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also banks if they grant credits. That they can access what you
bought at Rewe [a German supermarket] in the past and then
infer from this you’re not able to handle money well and then
refuse to grant you the crucial credit.” (P1)
B. Protection obstacles
We identified five obstacles that prevent our participants
from protecting their data, with three concerning their skills
and motivation, and one concerning other people and ethical
considerations, respectively.
1) Too much effort: Some participants (9) reported to
refrain from reading security policies since these were too
cumbersome to understand. The same seems to apply regard-
ing the use of privacy-friendly applications: “Because after all
it [Threema] is rather cumbersome. And because only a few
people use it and I think you can still share everyday things
via WhatsApp.” (P16)
2) Too complicated: Very few participants (2) complained
about privacy policies being too complicated to understand.
3) Lack of knowledge: This is in line with a few participants
(4) stating lack of knowledge about protection possibilities
and processing of their released data as one reason for not
protecting themselves more: “I wish I’d know which data I
should protect better and how. Maybe I also would take better
care if I’d know. If I’d concentrate more on this I’d probably
know why it is important to protect these data, but it’s just too
hard for me to access these information.” (P12)
4) Behavior of other people: A few participants (8) referred
to other people who refrained to use alternative privacy-
friendly messengers or even shared data about third people: “In
my opinion, if you have the opportunity to use a secure service,
why shouldn’t you do it, I think. The only thing speaking
against it is, for example Telegram, it’s just not spread that
much. If you delete WhatsApp and only use Telegram, you
simply don’t reach a huge amount of your friends.” (P8) “With
social networks like Facebook [...] as soon as anybody posts
something or tags you, it’s already gotten out where you are
or where you were or anything.” (P4)
5) Ethical considerations: One participant also explained
that s/he thought it would be unethical to use free services
that build on the processing of personal data as their business
model without proving personal data: “The thing is, the
anonymous search engines use Google’s data, more or less...I
think, in terms of ethics, that’s kind of...not perfectly ethical,
with the anonymous search engines using Google’s servers,
since they cost and not giving something in exchange to
Google for this...to use it for free...actually the deal is that
Google shows ads for this.” (P13)
Furthermore, participants stated four different reasons for
using applications or devices that could possibly harm their
privacy, with all but one being related to social factors.
6) Social pressure: Most (19) participants reported to use
certain messenger or OSNs, even if they are skeptical towards
them in terms of privacy protection, because most of their
friends also use them: “Well, I actually view WhatsApp with
skepticism due to reasons of data privacy. However, since all of
my friends use WhatsApp I also use it, for you won’t get very
far with an alternative messenger that might be more suitable
but that nobody uses.” (P1) Accordingly, they stated that they
would transfer to other messengers or OSN if their friends
would do so. However, this effect also applies to the use
of such applications that are considered as privacy-friendly:
“Friends of mine started with this and then all of them had it
and then we had a group chat and then everyone transferred to
Threema and then I thought ‘Come on, then you’re also going
to Threema’.” (P11)
7) To keep oneself and others up-to-date: Many partici-
pants stated to use OSN to keep themselves informed of what
happens in the life of their friends and family or to inform
others about what is going on in their own life: “Once in a
while you wonder about what friends with whom you don’t
meet very often do at the moment. [...] I don’t get an email,
I don’t get a WhatsApp message, I get all information via
Facebook what happens in my surroundings.” (P8) “[...] I want
my family - because we live so far apart...sometimes I like it
to communicate with them. [...] so they know where I am,
where I was on the weekend, I don’t know, stuff like this and
I want to show it, because they want to know how I am and
they want to know what I did.” (P17)
8) Convenience: Some participants (7) admitted to use
certain applications out of convenience: “Anyhow you have
an easy opportunity to contact a large amount of people and
invite to something, who have then the opportunity to discuss
things like who brings what, when does it start, what’s the
address again in this group or event. And that simplifies a lot
of things.” (P5)
9) Express one’s opinion: Very few participants (2) referred
to the opportunity to express and spread their own opinion
about a certain topic: “But when I post something then often
with the idea to let people in my social surroundings know
something, either what I do or what I like. [...] Last year at
Christmas I found out about gift coupons offered by the Oxfam
company that supported charitable projects. That’s something
I want more people to know of and maybe support it, and so
I spread it.” (P2)
C. Protection strategies
Most of the strategies participants described to deploy for
protecting their data relied on reducing data disclosure, either
by not using certain services, not sharing certain data or limit-
ing the amount of recipients. Some participants, however, also
reported to actively provide false or misleading information to
“confuse the system”.
1) Refrain from using services that could infringe upon
one’s privacy: Some participants (8) deliberately decided
not to use certain services to prevent these from accessing
their data. The list of these “critical” services does not only
comprise apps demanding extensive permissions and OSN, but
also game consoles, Google’s search engine, loyalty programs,
cookies and applications that gather certain kinds of data
(e.g., one’s location). Some participants reported not to use
those privacy-critical services right from the start, whereas
114
others have used them for some time but then decided to
abandon the use. In their choice of an alternative service,
participants mainly relied on the service provider’s reputation:
“Well, regarding the phone, that I use an iPhone and not an
Android, of which...You know both share information with
the NSA, but as far as I know only Google also uses it for
marketing purposes [...].” (P13) Another strategy is to rely on
the opinion of experts: “For example, Signal is recommended
by Edward Snowden [...] it helps in the decision to use it if
someone like Edward Snowden recommends it.” (P13)
2) Do not share sensitive data: Some participants (13)
stated to not share certain kinds of data, e.g., their name, email
address, phone number, location, and bank data. However, only
one participant mentioned his/her sharing behavior in OSN in
this regard: “If you have liked ‘ZEIT ONLINE’ [a German
newspaper], you always get their news feed and some things
there are interesting every once in a while, where you think it
would be worthwhile to promote it a little and it could interest
someone, e.g., a pal, but instead of liking it or tagging my pal,
I leave it be and think ‘whatever’.” (P8)
3) Limit the amount of data recipients: A few participants
(2) reported to share data, but limit the amount of recipients,
for example by reducing the number of Facebook friends or
not posting something on Facebook at all because they have so
many friends there: “Maybe because so many are watching.
Back then you had about 30 friends, it didn’t matter what
you posted on your timeline. And now it’s, I don’t know
for sure, like 400. Thus you think twice before you post
something.” (P8) Others use Facebook’s privacy settings to
keep their postings away from unwanted readers.
4) Provide false or misleading information: A few partic-
ipants (6) reported to act according to the principle “security
through obscurity” by providing false information on purpose,
mainly by using a false identity: “Well, depending on the
service provider, quasi depending on the importance, I also
provide false data, I don’t simply use false data but instead I
have set up a fake profile which I always use.” (P10)
D. Common privacy (mis)conceptions
We also identified certain (mis)conceptions about data pri-
vacy in our participants’ responses that have already been
observed by other privacy researchers in prior studies.
1) I have nothing to hide: Some participants stated they
were not interested in privacy very much because their data
was not sensitive at all: “Yes, well, I must say I don’t get the
whole hype about this...I always think those who have nothing
to hide don’t have to be so upset about it. [...] if someone
would intercept me, I’d say he wouldn’t find anything or it
wouldn’t be relevant [...]” (P15)
2) I am not important enough: Accordingly, a few partici-
pants also thought they were too unimportant to be intercepted:
“[...] but I have a lot of confidence. On the one hand in the
systems, on the other hand that I am too ordinary. That it
wouldn’t be worthwhile to spy on my data.” (P2)
3) It is not possible to protect my data: A few participants
said even if they wanted to do so, it would not be possible to
protect their data from being accessed in one way or another:
“I think it is like the lock at my apartment, if someone really
wants to get in he can break it open. If someone really wants
to have my data, he gets it. Once I use smartphones and
notebooks, that’s a truth I have to deal with...or that I have to
accept, respectively.” (P18)
V. DISCUSSION
We conducted an interview study with 24 participants to
shed light on why and how users’ do protect or refrain from
protecting their privacy.
A. Mental models of privacy consequences
Regarding RQ1, we found that while most participants
named personalized advertisement as a possible consequence
of not protecting one’s privacy and about half of our par-
ticipants also fear financial losses, most participants lack
awareness of further possible privacy consequences. This is
in line with the results from Harbach et al. [21] and Shirazi
and Volkamer [30], who also identified financial loss and
personal advertisement as the most salient privacy conse-
quences. However, individual participants provided additional
possible consequences besides personalized advertisement and
financial loss. The list of resulting consequences also relates
to the results of Karwatzki et al. [23], since all consequences
named by our participants could be categorized as either
physical, social, resource-related, psychological, prosecution-
related, career-related, or freedom-related. However, most con-
sequences provided by our participants are more specific than
the broad categories of consequences identified by Karwatzki
et al. [23], and some refer to more than one category. The
resulting list of consequences could thus be better suited to
complete people’s mental models of possible data collection
consequences, e.g., in interventions and campaigns than Kar-
watzki et al.’s categories.
B. Obstacles for privacy protection
Regarding RQ2, we found that participants refrain from
applying protection solutions or using privacy-friendly alterna-
tives since these are too cumbersome to use, too complicated
to understand, or due to the contradictory behavior of other
people. In line with this, most participants reported to still use
privacy-threatening services (e.g., OSN, messenger) in order
to reach other people, participate in their life, or share their
opinion with others. Another reason for using non-privacy-
friendly services and devices is the convenience that these
products offer. Contrary to prior studies (e.g., [30], [32], [50]),
the major obstacles for privacy protection reported by our
participants are related to usability and social factors, of which
the latter were also identified to be crucial for the adoption of
secure messengers by Abu-Salma et al. [33]. Whereas there
are already many ongoing efforts to improve the usability of
PETs (successful or not), social factors are harder to influence
from the outside, i.e., as a privacy researcher or activist. Yet
there also lies an opportunity in people’s social suggestability,
as some also report to having started to use a privacy-friendly
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service because a significant other used this service as well.
Hence, future attempts to motivate users to increase their
privacy could focus on the social aspect, for example by
letting other people invite their peers to privacy-friendly OSN,
messengers, search engines etc.
C. Strategies for protecting one’s privacy
Regarding RQ3, our participants reported to apply several
privacy protection strategies, i.e., refrain from using privacy-
threatening services, not share sensitive data, limit the amount
of data recipients, or provide false information. These strate-
gies indicate that our participants do not suffer from an
“illusion of control”, in the sense that they think their privacy
is safe because they can decide what kind of information
is shared with whom and have the possibility to change
this decision later on, e.g., by editing their profile, while
actually once an information is shared online users cannot
control who already gained access to that information and
how it is processed by third parties in the future. However,
some participants reported a lack of knowledge about possible
protection measures to be an obstacle for privacy protection,
and some participants did not report on applying a successful
protection strategy at all. Furthermore, all of the protection
strategies our participants reported to use fall in the category
of “behavioral” protection strategies described by Oomen and
Leenes [17]. None of our participants reported to use standard
security measures and PETs or more advances PETs. Whereas
we suppose this is rather due to a lack of knowledge about
what programs are running on their computer and how these
are involved in the protection of their private data than an
actual abandonment of standard security measures, it shows
significant deficits in our participants’ understanding of how
data is processed on their computer. These results are contrary
to those of Litt [47], who found that younger adults tend to
apply more technically based protection strategies. Although
our sample was rather young, our participants do not seem to
be automatically more technically adept than older users.
Hence, it is not sufficient to hope that problems referring to
a lack of technical expertise in the deployment of protection
strategies will vanish on their own once most online users
are digital natives. It seems thus crucial to further educate
users about strategies for privacy protection, e.g., by develop-
ing trainings, campaigns, info material, or dedicated privacy
assistants that provide information about possible protection
solutions and help users to apply these solutions successfully.
Overall, our results suggest that there is no single factor
determining whether people protect their private data or not,
as our results provide evidence for all possible explanations for
people failing to protect their data proposed in the introduction
(i.e., lack of awareness regarding consequences, costs out-
weight benefits in a rational analysis, lack of knowledge about
protection solutions or illusion of control about the handling
of shared data). Since we further identified additional factors
which influnce whether people adopt measures to protect their
privacy, we propose a model which subsumes all factors that
are relevant for people’s decision to actually apply privacy
protection measures. This model will be introduced in the
following section.
D. Factors influencing the adoption of privacy protection
measures
We identified four factors with various sub-categories that
influence whether people are motivated and able to suc-
cessfully protect their private data. The resulting model is
displayed in figure 1.
In line with results from other studies [10], [30], [32], [33],
[50], we found that usability is not the most important factor
for the adoption of protection measures. Other factors, such as
conceptions about being important, having something to hide,
and the awareness of negative consequences that could arise
from privacy violations also play an important role regarding
people’s motivation to think about the protection of their data.
Once they are motivated, they also need to possess certain
knowledge about how to protect their data, protection should
not be too complicated and the people need to believe in
the possibility of data protection. If people are motivated and
able to deal with privacy issues, they will likely consider the
costs of data protection in their decision for or against the
adoption of data protection measures. Hence, people are more
likely to adopt such protection measures if these are effortless,
do not cause ethical concerns, and the functionalities of the
services still support people in attaining their goals. Due to
the social component of many data-capturing services like
OSN or messengers, the behavior of other people also plays
an important role. People are more likely to use encrypted,
privacy-friendly messengers or encrypt their emails if their
friends also do this. Moreover, people cannot sufficiently
protect their data if other people share it, e.g., on OSN sites.
Our results verified all factors influencing privacy protection
(or the lack thereof) identified in other studies [10], [30],
[32], [33], [50] that are not dependent on the specific context
investigated in the respective studies. We further identified
three new sub-categories, namely: (1) Being ethically correct
when protecting one’s data, (2) keep oneself and others up to
date, (3) other people not sharing one’s data.
Consequently, in order to provide useful tools for privacy
protection, developers of PETs have to consider the identi-
fied factors that influence the adoption of privacy protecting
measures. The results indicate that this could be done by
raising awareness of privacy issues on the one hand and
providing knowledge on the other hand via PETs. Further,
PETs have to be easy and effortless to use, and not affect
the core functionalities of online services that motivate people
to share their data in the first place, such as contacting other
people. Last but not least, other people have to support privacy
protective behavior by also using protection solutions, such as
end-to-end encryption, and refrain from sharing other people’s
data. This issue could possibly be addressed by implementing
a feature to easily invite other people to use certain protection
solutions one wants to use, for example for communication, as
it is already implemented in popular services like Facebook.
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Fig. 1. Model of factors influencing privacy protection. The references in the gray boxes indicate what factors have also been identified in previous studies.
E. Limitations
The study suffers from several limitations that should be
kept in mind when drawing conclusions based on the results.
We used a convenience sample, which resulted in the majority
of our participants being students, thus our sample is most
likely skewed (i.e., younger, higher educated and eventually
over averagely tech-savvy) compared to the general popula-
tion. Furthermore, it would be recommendable to validate the
results with a greater number of participants. Also, although
we aimed to investigate the general privacy behavior of people
across different contexts, some online services, such as online
social networks and messengers, are very well-known to most
people, unlike new devices and services like smart home
systems. Hence, it is likely that these contexts are over-
represented in the answers of our participants.
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investigation into smartphone security,” in Security and Trust Man-
agement. STM 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9331,
S. Foresti, Ed., 2015, pp. 265–273.
118
